What are the changes to the law?
On 25th June 2020, the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act, among other things, introduced new restrictions on suppliers of goods and services to terminate the contract in the event that the customer enters an insolvency process. This has very important consequences for many businesses as it could expose them to greater financial risks.
Related FAQs
No. This bill relates to corporate insolvencies only. Should you require any advice as to personal insolvency situations, please contact our team.
This is unlikely. Frustration is a doctrine rarely used as a way of getting out of leases. It operates to bring a lease to an early end because of the effect of a supervening event. It is then not a concept readily applicable to a situation where one party is looking to get out of a lease. To be able to argue the doctrine of frustration, you must be able to demonstrate that something unforeseeable has happened that makes it impossible to fulfil the lease and unjust to hold a party to its obligations.
This is not something that can be demonstrated easily.
There was a case in the High Court last year when the doctrine of frustration was looked at in a case involving the European Medical Agency.
The court found that Brexit did not frustrate EMA’s lease. EMA was granted leave to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeal, but unfortunately, the parties settled out of court so the arguments were not tested in the higher court.
Another reason why frustration is likely to fail is an argument that, whilst the current lockdown may force closures to businesses and whilst such closures maybe for a lengthy period, such closures will only be temporary.
Yes, but only for work purposes and where it is unreasonable to do so from home. Work colleagues cannot meet to socialise.
If the duties are so fundamentally different from their contracted role, then yes. For example, if you are asking a frontline clinical member of staff to undertake administrative tasks in another area, then this will be a fundamental change to their terms and conditions for which you need their consent.
If there is a minor alteration to their duties, or the clause within their contract is wide enough to cover their amended duties, then arguably to do not need their consent but best practice would be to obtain their agreement.
Hopefully, further guidance will provide additional clarification on this, but it is difficult to see how a charity whose operations have been significantly curtailed because of the Covid-19 restrictions, cannot furlough employees and access the scheme, in particular where they have several different income streams. For example if a charity’s retail or fundraising operations have been significantly curtailed due to the restrictions, then it would appear unfair for it not to able to rely on the furlough scheme to assist in the funding of the employment costs associated with this part of the charity.
However, it might be prudent, where there are services that are publicly funded and employees working within those services cannot undertake their normal work, to consider if they can do different roles to work on Covid-19 activities. If there is no such work available then the guidance does appear to allow the furloughing of employees and such organisations to access the scheme.
In our experience, the funding streams and work undertaken by the organisations that could fall into the third category identified above can be exceptionally diverse and we would strongly recommend that you take advice before making such decisions about furloughing employees.